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Abstract  
Many  societal-­‐‑political  aspects  of  climate  change  act  as  barriers  to  positive  climate  change  action.  Despite  the  
efforts  of  scientific  researchers,  stakeholders  and  the  media,  effective  and  accurate  communication  of  
Antarctic  science  is  below  an  acceptable  standard.  The  findings  and  implications  of  high-­‐‑quality  Antarctic  
climate  change  science  are  failing  to  resonate  with  civil  society  and  policy  makers,  dictating  the  need  to  re-­‐‑
evaluate  how  members  of  society  cognitively  approach  the  contentious  issue  of  climate  change  and  how  
current  Antarctic  science  communication  resources  are  distributed.  An  individual’s  worldview,  cognitive  
mindset  and  religious  dogmas  in  conjunction  with  misreporting  and  misinterpretation  of  climate  science  are  
all  factors  influencing  how  an  individual  responds  to  the  climate  change  message  but  rarely  have  they  been  
analysed  together  as  a  complete  overview.  In  this  report,  we  introduce  a  new  approach,  advising  that  climate  
scientists,  policy  makers  and  other  relevant  stakeholders  are  involved  in  all  stages  of  science  acquisition,  
legislation  and  decision  making  through  a  targeted  boundary  committee,  strongly  integrated  with  a  thorough  
education,  outreach  and  communication  (EOC)  approach,  within  SCAR,  and  tasked  with  communicating  
Antarctic  science  and  its  global  teleconnections.  We  draw  on  the  barriers  identified  through  literature  
investigation  to  establish  this  recommendation.  The  incorporation  of  a  strong  EOC  approach  in  climate  
science  communication  will  provide  the  catalyst  required  for  substantial  climate  change  action.  
     
Background  
From  the  late  20th  century  to  the  early  21st  century,  the  prominent  environmental  and  socio-­‐‑political  issue  of  
climate  change  has  risen  to  the  forefront  of  popular  debate.  The  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  
has  stated  with  95%  confidence  that  human  activity  is  the  dominant  cause  of  observed  changes  in  global  
temperatures  since  the  mid-­‐‑20th  century  (Solomon  et  al.,  2007).  Increases  in  air  and  ocean  temperatures,  rising  
sea  levels  and  large-­‐‑scale  snow  and  ice  melt  have  been  observed  throughout  the  world,  along  with  changes  to  
intensity  and  frequency  in  extreme  weather  and  climate  events,  underlining  the  presence  of  anthropogenic  
climate  forcing  in  our  world  today  (Solomon  et  al.,  2007).  The  Earth’s  climate  is  a  dynamic,  non-­‐‑linear  system,  
requiring  astute  comprehension  of  its  constituent  biological,  chemical  and  physical  components  before  the  
future  impacts  of  global  climate  change  can  be  properly  understood  (Schneider,  2004).  Earth  system  science  
integrates  research  from  numerous  academic  disciplines  to  view  the  Earth  as  a  progressive  system,  which  in  
turn  provides  a  physical  framework  to  understand  the  world  (Kennicutt  II,  2014).  In  order  to  reduce  
uncertainty  about  aspects  of  the  climate  system,  there  is  a  distinct  need  for  global  observation  systems  to  
provide  long-­‐‑term  climatological  and  environmental  observation  datasets  for  palaeoclimate  model  
verification  and  future  projections;  however  as  yet,  only  fractions  of  it  exist  (Karl  &  Trenberth,  2003).      
Antarctica  is  of  global  environmental,  political  and  scientific  significance.  It  is  governed  through  a  complex  
system  of  international  legal  agreements,  entitled  the  Antarctic  Treaty  System,  which  has  designated  
Antarctica  as  a  continent  for  the  purposes  of  peace  and  science  (Joyner,  1998).  Antarctica  is  often  described  as  
a  global  commons,  although  competing  claims  for  sovereignty  often  relegates  its  status  to  ‘disputed  
commons’  (Joyner,  1998),  and  Buck  (1998)  states  that  an  area  governed  by  a  regime  admitting  only  a  small  
number  of  nations  should  be  considered  an  international  commons.  The  Protocol  on  Environmental  
Protection  to  the  Antarctic  Treaty  in  Madrid  in  1991  affected  the  Antarctic  regime  so  that  it  does  have  qualities  
of  a  global  commons  (Buck,  1998).  The  global  commons  are  defined  as  areas  or  resources  outside  the  
jurisdiction  of  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  –  either  belonging  to  no  one  or  to  everyone  (Dunoff,  1992;  
Joyner,  1998).  The  atmosphere,  outer  space  and  deep  ocean  are  the  principal  models  of  a  global  commons;,  
however,  Antarctica  avoids  traditional  designation  and  crosses  both  categories  of  commons,  adding  to  the  
exclusivity  of  the  continent  (Joyner,  1998).    
The  Fourth  Assessment  Report  (AR4)  by  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  (IPCC)  has  
identified  a  lack  of  continuous  data  availability  on  Antarctic  climate  observations,  necessitating  an  increase  in  
Antarctic  science  research  and  data  sharing  between  all  nations  (Solomon  et  al.,  2007).  Antarctic  climate  
research  is  critical  to  improving  overall  understanding  of  the  Earth’s  climate  system,  due  to  the  global  
connectivity  of  the  atmosphere  and  ocean,  and  Antarctica’s  importance  in  the  geotectonic  regime  (Kennicutt  
II,  2014).  The  instrumental  period,  or  the  beginning  of  long  time-­‐‑series  scientific  observations  (measurements  
before  this  time  were  not  continuous),  began  with  the  International  Geophysical  Year  on  July  1st  1957  and  
initiated  Antarctic-­‐‑specific  climate  change  study  which  continues  today  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  The  International  
Geophysical  Year  was  an  international  science  convention  that  aimed  to  bridge  gaps  that  the  Cold  War  had  
created  in  scientific  exchange  between  the  East  and  West  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  
Continuous  scientific  studies  in  the  southernmost  continent  began  in  1957,  and  were  greatly  improved  upon  
with  the  incorporation  of  satellite  measurements  after  1980  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  The  IPCC’s  fifth  assessment  
report  (AR5)  found  that  satellite  and  in  situ  observations  of  the  Antarctic  had  improved  considerably  between  
the  AR4  (in  2007)  and  the  AR5  (in  2013),  improving  understanding  of  ice  sheet  dynamics  and  drivers,  but  
there  is  still  much  to  be  done  (Vaughan  et  al.,  2013).  
Prominent  research  areas  of  current  Antarctic  climate  science  include  ozone  depletion  in  the  atmosphere  over  
Antarctica,  sea  level  rise,  CO2  sequestration  in  the  Southern  Ocean,  and  changes  to  the  cryosphere  –  
particularly  issues  of  ice  shelf  and  ice  sheet  mass  balance,  stability  of  the  ice  sheets,  and  sea  ice  trends  
(Solomon  et  al.,  2007).  Some  examples  of  these  research  areas  follow  here,  to  demonstrate  the  importance  of  
Antarctic  climate  science  in  determining  global  impacts  of  climate  change.  
Ozone  levels  at  altitudes  between  14  and  22  km  above  Antarctica  began  to  decline  in  the  late  1970s  with  the  
extensive  injection  of  CFCs  into  the  atmosphere  through  industrial  activity,  destroying  virtually  all  ozone  in  
this  altitude  range  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  Full  recovery  of  the  ozone  hole  over  the  Antarctic  to  1980  levels  is  
expected  to  occur  around  2068  (Newman  et  al.,  2006).  The  ozone  hole  maintains  cooling  within  the  polar  
vortex  by  intensifying  circumpolar  winds  and  protecting  Antarctica  from  warming.  Research  into  how  
Antarctica  may  warm  with  the  re-­‐‑emergence  of  1980  ozone  levels  will  be  closely  examined  in  the  coming  
decades  (Solomon  et  al.,  2007).    
Sea  level  rise  due  to  Antarctic  ice  sheet  losses  are  very  likely  to  have  contributed  to  sea  level  rise  over  1993  to  
2003;  indeed,  the  IPCC  has  quoted  sea  level  rise  as  0.21  ±  0.35  mm  per  year  over  this  time  period  (Solomon  et  
al.,  2007).  Flow  speed  has  increased  for  some  Antarctic  outlet  glaciers  (Scambos  et  al.,  2004),  indicating  that  
the  contribution  of  Antarctica  to  global  sea  level  rise  may  increase  in  coming  years,  requiring  substantial  
monitoring.    
The  Southern  Ocean  absorbs  a  substantial  amount  of  atmospheric  CO2  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  Strong  westerly  
winds  enforce  a  mixing  regime  between  surface  water  and  deeper  CO2-­‐‑rich  water,  restricting  further  
absorption  into  the  surface  water  due  to  carbon  dioxide  saturation  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  This  also  changes  the  
pH  balance  in  Southern  Ocean  waters,  creating  more  acidic  surface  waters  with  the  potential  to  interrupt  the  
biological  pump,  which  has  significant  ecological  impacts  and  teleconnections  (Maas  et  al.,  2013).  A  lower  pH,  
through  saturation  of  the  upper  ocean,  has  been  shown  to  decrease  the  calcification  rate  of  calcifying  
organisms  as  investigated  by  Feely  et  al.  (2004).  Data  regarding  the  size  of  the  CO2  sink  in  the  Southern  Ocean  
is  relatively  sparse,  and  fluctuations  in  annual  CO2  levels  are  unknown  (Le  Quéré  et  al.,  2008),  Additional  
large-­‐‑scale  monitoring  of  the  Southern  Ocean  is  required.    
Ice  shelves  on  both  the  easterly  and  westerly  margins  of  the  Antarctic  Peninsula  have  begun  to  retreat  in  
recent  decades,  changing  the  cryospheric  composition  of  the  surrounding  region  (Turner  et  al.,  2009).  The  
collapse  of  the  Larsen  B  ice  shelf  during  February-­‐‑March,  2002,  is  a  prime  example.  The  reason  for  the  ice  
shelf  collapse  has  been  proposed  as  a  consequence  of  a  record  high  in  air  temperature,  a  long  surface  melt  
season  and  large  melt  pond  extent  (Scambos  et  al.,  2000).  Subsequent  increase  in  the  centreline  flow  speed  of  
four  glaciers  adjacent  to  the  remnant  ice  shelf  has  been  observed  as  a  consequence  of  the  Larsen  B  
disintegration  (Scambos  et  al.,  2004).  Velocity  increases  may  affect  the  rate  at  which  sea  level  rises;  therefore,  
further  investigation  of  these  interactions  is  needed.    
Clearly,  Antarctic  climate  research  output,  including  the  global  connectivity  of  changes  to  the  Antarctic  region  
under  climate  change,  is  compelling  –  however,  there  is  a  lack  of  global  action  towards  mitigating  further  
releases  of  greenhouse  gases  that  could  cause  catastrophic  changes  to  Antarctica  and  the  global  climate  in  the  
future.  In  this  paper,  we  investigate  current  literature  to  ascertain  the  state  of  communication  of  both  of  
Antarctic  climate  science  and  climate  science  in  general,  and  discuss  existing  barriers  to  obtaining  public  and  
political  support  for  climate  action.  We  will  then  examine  more  effective  ways  of  developing  and  
communicating  climate  science  from  Antarctica,  including  interdisciplinary  and  boundary  work,  and  
conclude  with  a  series  of  recommendations  to  gain  traction  on  socio-­‐‑political  aspects  of  climate  change.  
     
Communicating  climate  science  
Excellence  in  scientific  research  is  no  longer  the  sole  focus  for  climate  scientists;  it  has  become  vital  for  
researchers  to  also  communicate  the  validity  and  importance  of  their  research  outcomes  to  both  policymakers  
and  the  general  public  (Fischhoff,  2007;  McBean  &  Hengeveld,  2000).  However,  this  can  be  challenging  for  
researchers,  as  communication  skills  are  often  absent  from  early-­‐‑career  science  training  and  tertiary  
education,  and  are  often  not  a  part  of  training  throughout  careers  either  (Heath  et  al.,  2014;  Liggett  et  al.,  2010;  
Trench  &  Miller,  2012).  There  are  calls  for  this  to  change,  arguing  that  communication  not  only  increases  
public  understanding  of  academic  research,  but  also  increases  the  value  of  research  itself  by  highlighting  new  
pathways  and  gaps  in  science  as  well  as  bridging  interdisciplinary  divides  (Baron,  2010).  Furthermore,  
scientists  with  training  in  science  communication  have  been  documented  as  being  more  likely  to  engage  with  
the  public  throughout  their  careers,  rendering  the  resources  and  time  required  to  train  young  scientists  in  
science  communication  a  worthy  investment  (Royal  Society,  2006).  It  has  also  been  suggested  that,  rather  than  
focusing  solely  on  training  more  scientists  in  communication  skills,  there  should  be  an  emphasis  on  training  
non-­‐‑scientists  (for  example,  business  people,  lawyers,  and  politicians)  to  understand  the  values  of  evidence-­‐‑
based  debate  and  refining  questions  based  on  evidence  (Mole,  2012).  
Provencher  et  al.  (2011)  suggest  that  in  order  to  achieve  effective  communication  outcomes,  a  dedicated  
Education,  Outreach  and  Communication  (EOC)  program  must  be  incorporated  into  research  programs.  
These  EOC  approaches  would  use  a  series  of  communication  methods  to  identify  target  audiences  and  utilise  
personnel  that  have  been  trained  in  science  communication  as  part  of  a  science  strategy  to  encourage  effective  
communicators  to  engage  further  with  the  community,  and  to  encourage  scientists  that  are  not  strong  
communicators  to  work  with  teams  that  already  have  robust  communication  and  public  relations  roles  
(Provencher  et  al.,  2011).    
Public  trust  in  science  
Scientific  research  throughout  history  has  largely  taken  place  in  academic  circles,  exclusive  of  public  
involvement  and  outreach,  which  has  resulted  in  a  wide  knowledge  gap  among  the  general  public,  and  at  
times,  suspicion  and  scepticism  of  scholarly  work  and  the  academic  elite  (Brush,  1989;  Provencher  et  al.,  2011).    
97%  of  climate  scientists  are  in  agreement  that  human  activity  is  the  dominant  cause  of  observed  changes  to  
global  climate  (NASA,  2015);  but  recent  research  by  the  Pew  Research  Centre  (2009)  found  during  a  survey  of  
US  citizens  that,  while  approximately  84%  of  scientists  (of  all  disciplines)  accept  the  science  of  anthropogenic  
climate  forcing,  only  49%  of  the  US  public  accept  it.  In  the  following  paragraphs,  the  subsequent  effects  of  this  
perceived  disciplinary  gap  are  examined  by  analysing  various  studies  on  the  public’s  perception  of  science,  
scientists  and  technology.  It  is  acknowledge  that  the  majority  of  these  are  from  Western  countries;  however,  
no  recent  studies  were  found  from  developing  countries  for  comparison.      
In  the  UK,  the  most  recent  study  of  the  general  public’s  attitude  towards  science  found  that,  of  2000  adults  
surveyed,  45%  agreed  that  funding  to  science  should  be  reduced  in  favour  of  increased  spending  elsewhere  in  
the  national  budget  (Castell  et  al.,  2014).  The  same  study  discovered  that  50%  of  participants  thought  of  
scientists  as  secretive,  while  more  than  one  third  believed  scientists  adjusted  findings  to  correspond  to  their  
hypothesis.  Few  participants  understood  the  peer  review  process,  and  30%  believed  academic  work  was  
rarely  checked  by  other  scientists  prior  to  publication.  Significantly,  60%  of  participants  felt  scientists  did  not  
make  sufficient  efforts  to  communicate  their  findings,  while  70%  stated  they  wished  to  hear  about  ethical  and  
social  implications  of  research  directly  from  the  scientists.  
A  similarly  high  level  of  interest  in  science  and  technology  was  recorded  in  a  study  from  Australia,  though  
knowledge  of  the  national  scientific  research  organisation,  the  CSIRO,  reduced  from  70%  among  participants  
aged  35  and  over,  to  35%  among  those  aged  18-­‐‑24,  suggesting  a  significant  lack  of  engagement  of  major  
research  organisations  with  youth  in  Australia  (Cormick,  2014).  A  study  in  the  USA  designed  to  measure  
scientific  knowledge  found  that  approximately  66%  of  participants  do  not  understand  the  scientific  
publication  process  and  that  trust  in  pseudoscience  is  quite  common,  with  60%  surveyed  believing  in  
extrasensory  perception  and  nearly  50%  considering  astrology  a  scientifically  valid  field  (NSF,  2004,2014).    
In  New  Zealand,  specifically  related  to  Antarctic  science,  it  is  a  much  better  situation.  It  was  found  that  public  
awareness  and  support  for  Antarctic  science  is  very  high,  with  a  survey  finding  that  70%  of  participants  
believed  Antarctic  involvement  from  the  NZ  government  was  at  least  ‘quite’  important  (Antarctica  New  
Zealand,  2010).  From  this  group  it  was  found  that  90%  believed  that  ‘protecting  the  environment  in  
Antarctica’  was  important,  and  87%  stating  that  it  was  important  to  help  with  science.  It  was  also  found  that  
the  main  reason  those  that  thought  it  was  important  for  the  NZ  government  to  be  involved  with  Antarctic  
science  was  due  to  its  significance  in  global  climate  (48%)  and  its  need  to  be  protected  (42%).    
Based  on  the  evidence  above,  other  than  the  positive  response  to  Antarctic  science  in  New  Zealand,  the  
general  trends  of  public  trust  and  engagement  with  science  are  concerning  and  pose  a  major  barrier  to  
effective  communication  of  climate  science  and  the  need  for  action.  Even  in  New  Zealand,  however,  as  
described  above  there  is  a  considerable  lack  of  understanding  or  value  placed  on  Antarctica’s  significance  in  
the  global  climate,  suggesting  that  there  still  exists  a  gap  that  needs  to  be  addressed.  
Another  issue  that  may  be  hindering  the  gain  of  support  and  trust  from  policy  makers  and  the  public  is  the  
notion  that  science  may  be  diminishing  wonder  and  intruding  on  humanities,  reducing  the  mystery  and  
ambiguity  of  the  world  (Pinker,  2013).  For  example,  the  notion  of  seeing  ‘beauty’  in  the  world  can  be  
explained  by  reactions  of  brain  chemistry  in  an  individual,  rather  than  spirituality,  and  that  behavioural  
‘ethics’  can  be  reduced  to  basic  human  instinct  and  natural  selection  (Pinker,  2013).  To  expand  upon  this,  
science  can  demonstrate  that  the  supposed  empirical  basis  for  some  moral  values  is,  quite  simply,  not  factual.  
For  example,  Pinker  states  ‘there  is  no  such  thing  as  fate,  providence,  karma,  spells,  curses,  augury,  divine  
retribution  or  answered  prayers.’  While  science  doesn’t  necessarily  dictate  values  and  beliefs,  it  can  provide  
the  framework  (Pinker,  2013).  This  is  supported  by  Lorenzoni  and  Pidgeon  (2006),  who  state  that  trust  of  an  
individual  is  unlikely  to  be  gained  if  the  science  does  not  align  with  that  individual’s  beliefs,  does  not  affect  
them  personally,  and/or  if  the  threat  is  not  immediate  and  serious.  
The  lack  of  trust  in  climate  scientists  may  also  be  due  to  the  dependency  on  technology  and  unwillingness  to  
change.  Most  people  are  aware  of  their  moral  obligations  towards  society  with  regard  to  climate  change,  
however  most  people  also  recognise  their  own  failings  to  enact  on  these  obligations  (Lorenzoni  &  Pidgeon,  
2006).  Another  source  of  this  mistrust  may  be  the  perceived  low  salience  of  climate  science;  there  are  
persistent  misunderstandings  about  climate  change  that  make  implementing  and  encouraging  mitigation  
methods  very  difficult  (Lorenzoni  &  Pidgeon,  2006).  A  more  in-­‐‑depth  discussion  of  this  is  presented  further  
into  this  report.  
A  significant  proportion  of  Antarctic  climate  research  has  a  propensity  towards  complex  interactions  with  
other  areas  of  climate  research.  As  an  example:  the  ozone  hole  cannot  be  treated  as  an  isolated  cause-­‐‑and-­‐‑
effect  incident  that  concerns  merely  the  CFCs  trapped  within  the  polar  vortex;  rather,  the  maintained  cooling  
of  the  polar  vortex  in  turn  intensifies  the  circumpolar  winds  that  protects  Antarctica  from  warming  but  also  
stimulates  surface  and  deep  water  Southern  Ocean  mixing  (Blunden  et  al.,  2011)  which  in  turn  affects  the  
previously  mentioned  Southern  Ocean  acidification.  Such  complex  physical  interactions  may  contribute  to  the  
problems  faced  by  climate  change  science  communication  that  can  be  plagued  by  claims  of  exaggerating  risk,  
sensationalism,  “bad”  science  and  incitation  of  public  hysteria  (Weingart  et  al.,  2000).    
Progress  toward  mitigating  the  effects  of  climate  change  will  only  be  made  if  the  public  is  educated  about  the  
global  interactions  between  components  of  the  climate  system  and  the  consequences  of  climate  change.  This  
could  be  achieved  through  communication  training  for  scientists,  as  discussed  previously,  and  it  is  widely  
agreed  that  research  focus  and  outputs  would  benefit  from  this  training  (Besley  &  Tanner,  2011).  
  
Where  does  the  general  public  obtain  scientific  information?  
The  media  has  many  outlets  for  communication  of  Antarctic  and  climate  science  through  news  reports,  press  
releases,  interviews,  television  shows,  blogs  and  websites.  In  Australia,  for  example,  visual  communication  of  
climate  science,  such  as  that  presented  on  television  (particularly  documentaries  and  news  programs),  in  
newspapers,  and  on  the  internet,  are  the  most  likely  sources  of  information  for  the  general  public  (Ashworth  
et  al.,  2011;  Cormick,  2014).  Similarly,  87%  of  online  American  adults  use  the  internet  to  research  science  
topics  and  59%  of  people  would  turn  to  the  internet  for  information  about  climate  change,  making  it  a  very  
important  resource  (Davies  &  Glasser,  2014;  Horrigan,  2006).  But  the  media  only  reaches  a  select  group  of  
people,  those  that  have  access  to  the  internet  and  TV  who  are  likely  to  be  relatively  wealthy,  educated,  and  
interested  in  science  (Horrigan,  2006).  For  example,  an  analysis  of  internet  traffic  on  a  website  about  Antarctic  
glaciers  showed  that  half  of  the  users  were  in  the  22-­‐‑35-­‐‑year-­‐‑old  age  bracket,  and  the  majority  were  university  
students  (Davies  &  Glasser,  2014).  Therefore,  other  demographics  are  not  as  exposed  to  information  through  
this  medium.  Long-­‐‑term  feedback  from  surveys  of  visitors  to  climate  and  Antarctic  science  media  is  needed  to  
discover  how  to  reach  other  demographics.  
The  public  can  also  gain  scientific  knowledge  from  other  sources  such  as  museums  and  public  lectures.  Many  
scientists  already  participate  in  these  events,  but  getting  the  public  interested  and  involved  is  still  a  challenge  
(Besley  &  Tanner,  2011).    Only  48%  of  Americans  go  to  a  zoo  or  aquarium  at  least  once  a  year,  26%  have  been  
to  a  natural  history  museum,  23%  have  been  to  a  science  or  technology  museum  and  14%  have  been  to  a  
planetarium  in  the  last  year  (Horrigan,  2006).  More  research  is  needed  into  how  these  other  stakeholders  can  
attract  not  only  higher  attendence,  but  also  a  wider  range  of  people.  Scientific  literacy  is  a  critical  component  
in  communicating  science  and  enabling  to  public  to  make  their  own  decisions  based  on  scientific  research,  
and  there  is  a  strong  connection  between  economic  development  and  sustainability  with  scientific  literacy  
(Provencher  et  al.,  2011).  
Misreporting  and  miscommunication  of  climate  science  
As  scientists  play  a  crucial  role  in  advising  policy,  their  advice  can  become  a  topic  of  contention  in  the  media,  
which  can  lead  to  their  research  being  misrepresented  or  miscommunicated  (Rapley  et  al.,  2014).  The  media  
has  a  huge  influence  on  public  attitude  toward  climate  science,  which  can  have  significant  consequences  
(Brulle  et  al.,  2012;  Rapley  et  al.,  2014).  It  can  occur  in  two  ways,  through  media  misreporting,  and  
misunderstanding  by  the  audience  (Bell,  1994).  However,  misrepresentation  is  not  a  new  phenomenon.  
Previous  global  issues  such  as  nuclear  weapons,  exposure  to  asbestos  and  lead,  acid  rain,  the  ozone  hole,  and  
tobacco  have  also  been  subject  to  misrepresentation  (Oreskes  &  Conway,  2010).  
Misrepresentation  is  a  worldwide  issue.  In  2013,  a  study  was  conducted  in  the  USA  on  the  accuracy  of  cable  
news  segments  about  climate  change  and  
found  that  while  92%  MSNBC  segments  were  
accurate,  only  70%  of  climate  science-­‐‑related  
segments  on  CNN  were  accurate  and  28%  of  
Fox  News  Channel  segments  were  accurate  
(Figure  1)  (Huertas  &  Kriegsman,  2014).  38%  
of  American  adults  watch  cable  news,  and  Fox  
News  is  the  most  popular  channel;  therefore  
the  lack  of  accuracy  in  programs  on  these  
channels  is  a  serious  problem  (Olmstead  et  al.,  
2013).  Segments  that  correctly  represented  
findings  from  climate  science  were  categorised  as  
accurate,  and  those  that  contained  any  inaccurate  or  
misleading  representations  of  climate  science  were  
classed  as  misleading,  in  accordance  with  the  best  
available  scientific  evidence  at  the  time  of  broadcast  (Huertas  &  Kriegsman,  2014).  The  majority  of  misleading  
news  segments  on  Fox  News  came  from  a  weekday  opinion  show  called  The  Five,  where  famous  news  
personalities  discuss  current  events  in  the  absence  of  science  or  industry  experts;  if  not  for  this  show,  Fox  
News  would  have  had  an  accuracy  rating  of  45%  (Huertas  &  Kriegsman,  2014).    
Misrepresentation  may  be  the  
reason  why  only  two-­‐‑thirds  of  
Americans  accept  the  science  of  
climate  change,  and  less  than  
half  of  the  population  recognise  
that  human  activities  are  the  
dominant  cause  (Leiserowitz  et  
al.,  2014;  Vaughan  et  al.,  2013).    
In  New  Zealand,  the  situation  is  
slightly  better  with  over  80%  of  
Figure  1:  The  accuracy  of  climate-­‐‑related  news  segments  
over  the  three  main  cable  news  networks  in  the  USA  (from  
Huertas  &  Kriegsman,  2014)  
Figure  2:  Accuracy  ratings  of  New  Zealand  climate-­‐‑related  
news  stories  (from  Bell,  1994)  
stories  classified  as,  at  worst,  slightly  inaccurate  (Figure  2);  however,  one  in  six  reports  were  significantly  
inaccurate  (Bell,  1994).  This  study  is,  of  course,  significantly  older  than  the  2014  study  in  the  USA,  and  
updated  research  into  the  accuracy  of  media  representation  in  New  Zealand  would  be  useful  to  more  
precisely  compare  media  representation  between  different  countries  –  however,  Bell  (1994)  is  currently  the  
most  recent  study  available  for  New  Zealand.    
In  January  2004,  Nature  published  a  study  by  Thomas  et  al.  (2004)  that  modelled  the  potential  effects  of  
climate  change  on  the  distributional  ranges  of  certain  groups  of  land  animals  and  plants,  predicting  between  
15-­‐‑37%  of  the  1103  species  considered  within  the  study  would  be  ‘committed  to  extinction’  by  2050  (not  the  
number  of  species  that  will  become  extinct  during  this  period).  This  became  a  global  news  item  that  was  
extensively  misrepresented.  21  reports  claimed  over  a  million  species  would  go  extinct  due  to  global  warming  
by  2050  and  only  2  reports  explained  that  only  a  few  species  would  actually  be  extinct  by  2050  (Ladle  et  al.,  
2005).  Several  reasons  for  this  have  been  suggested:  that  perhaps  the  news  reporters  did  not  understand  the  
article;  the  need  for  sound  bites  could  have  engendered  oversimplification;  information  may  have  been  taken  
from  an  indirect  source  rather  than  the  original  source;  or  the  story  could  have  been  exaggerated  in  an  effort  
to  sell  more  newspapers  (Ladle  et  al.,  2005).    
Another  example  of  misrepresentation  was  when  the  U.K.  Met  Office’s  Hadley  Centre  reported  that  the  last  
decade  had  seen  a  sputtering  rather  than  a  steady  increase  in  global  temperatures.  They  stated  that  warming  
is  set  to  resume  quickly  and  strongly  but  it  resulted  in  articles  such  as  the  BBC  News  “What  Happened  to  
Global  Warming?”  (Hudson,  2009).  A  flurry  of  media  activity  followed,  with  broadcasting  of  many  conflicting  
opinions  (Boykoff,  2013),  making  it  difficult  for  the  public  to  know  who  to  trust  or  believe.    
Scandals  have  contributed  to  the  misrepresentation  of  climate  science  and  scientists  in  the  media.  For  
example,  in  July  2006,  ABC  News  revealed  that  the  Intermountain  Rural  Electric  Association  paid  $100,000  to  
climate  skeptic  Patrick  Michaels  to  downplay  mankind’s  role  in  climate  change  and  confuse  public  
understanding  of  anthropogenic  climate  change  (Boykoff,  2013).  In  2007,  The  Guardian  newspaper  revealed  a  
call  from  the  American  Enterprise  Institute  that  “offered  payments  for  articles  that  emphasise  the  
shortcomings  of  a  report  from  the  UN  IPCC  (Boykoff,  2013).  The  climate  science  scandal  of  ‘Climategate’  
occurred  in  2009,  when  the  email  accounts  of  climate  researchers  from  universities  in  the  UK  and  USA  were  
hacked,  and  phrases  from  personal  communications  about  their  work  published  out  of  context  to  paint  
climate  scientists  as  fraudulent  and  manipulative,  and  to  cast  doubt  on  the  reliability  and  morality  of  the  peer  
review  process  (Grundmann,  2013).  Although  investigations  cleared  the  scientists  of  any  wrongdoing,  
significant  damage  had  been  done  to  the  public  opinion  and  trust  of  climate  scientists  and  research  
(Leiserowitz  et  al.,  2014;  Leiserowitz  et  al.,  2013;  Maibach  et  al.,  2012)  
Subsequently,  many  climate  scientists  have  avoided  engaging  with  the  media  about  their  research,  partially  
out  of  fear  of  being  misrepresented  (Besley  &  Tanner,  2011;  Davies  &  Glasser,  2014).  From  a  scientist’s  
perspective,  there  are  many  causes  of  misrepresentation,  such  as  oversimplification.  Media  articles  are  often  
considered  too  simple  and  short  to  supply  adequate  information  (Davies  &  Glasser,  2014).  Indeed,  
approximately  49%  of  scientists  believe  media  oversimplification  was  a  ‘major  problem’  for  ‘science  in  
general’  (Press,  2009).    Oversimplification  increases  the  risk  of  misrepresentation,  and  therefore  the  credibility  
of  the  information  (Rapley  et  al.,  2014).  Scientists  also  believe  that  the  media  is  unable  to  distinguish  between  
good  and  bad  science,  and  print  articles  that  are  not  scientifically  sound  (Besley  &  Tanner,  2011).  Journalists  
consider  it  their  job  to  be  objective  and  account  for  all  opinions,  and  if  climate  scientists  do  not  cooperate,  
journalists  will  get  their  information  from  other  sources  (Boykoff,  2013).  
To  reduce  misrepresentation  of  climate  science  and  scientists  in  the  media,  it  is  imperative  that  scientists  learn  
to  frame  information  in  a  way  that  is  accessible  to  public,  without  compromising  truth  (Bonetta,  2007).  Basic  
facts  of  articles  need  to  be  accurate,  and  any  uncertainties  about  the  information  needs  to  reported  (Bell,  1994).  
Finally,  the  media  needs  to  play  its  part  in  reducing  sensationalism  to  allow  people  to  form  their  own  
opinions  (Huertas  &  Kriegsman,  2014).     
Political  decision-­‐‑making  on  climate  
change  
The  most  significant  motivation  for  governments  to  commit  to  action  to  mitigation  climate  change  is  public  
support  and  ‘license  to  govern’(Hatfield-­‐‑Dodds  et  al.,  2007b),  despite  economic  modelling  demonstrating  that  
taking  leadership  to  reduce  future  economic  and  social  risks  of  climate  change  is  affordable  and  financially  
responsible  (Hatfield-­‐‑Dodds  et  al.,  2007a).  It  is  therefore  imperative  to  gain  public  understanding  and  support  
for  climate  action  in  order  to  engender  change  in  political  motivations.  Here,  we  discuss  some  of  the  barriers  
to  robust  climate  action,  and  identify  opportunities  for  obtaining  public  and  political  support  for  mitigation  
policies.  
Spatial  and  temporal  disparity  
The  timeline  during  which  climate  change  impacts  will  come  into  full  force  is  disparate  from  the  timelines  of  
resource  consumption  and  short-­‐‑term  political  action.  Thermal  inertia  in  the  climate  system  results  in  a  delay  
in  the  response  of  the  climate  to  alterations  in  the  Earth’s  radiation  balance  which,  depending  on  the  level  of  
climate  sensitivity,  could  be  on  a  scale  of  decades  to  over  a  century  (Hansen  et  al.,  2005).  Projections  of  the  
disintegration  of  the  West  Antarctic  ice  sheet  state  that  within  two  centuries,  the  Thwaites  Glacier  will  likely  
begin  rapid  collapse,  causing  the  West  Antarctic  ice  sheet  to  flood  with  seawater  and  eventually  disintegrate  
entirely  over  the  following  few  centuries  (Sumner,  2014).  This  disassociates  the  future  impacts  of  climate  
change  with  the  everyday  life  of  many  people  alive  today,  and  with  a  political  cycle  of  4-­‐‑5  years  in  most  
developed  countries,  this  can  act  as  a  disincentive  for  politicians  to  commit  to  long-­‐‑term  strategies  of  climate  
action  that  produce  little  tangible  benefit  during  the  lifetime  of  the  administration  (Hale,  2010).  Non-­‐‑
governmental  actors,  such  as  NGOs  and  community  groups,  are  vital  in  diluting  this  political  disincentive  in  
the  policy  conversation  (Hale,  2010).  
Similarly,  because  greenhouse  gases  disperse  into  the  atmosphere  upon  emission  and  spread  throughout  the  
globe,  there  is  an  increasingly  abstract  relationship  between  the  consumer  of  a  greenhouse  gas  emitting  
resource  and  the  impact  of  its  emission  (Purdy,  2010).  For  example,  a  study  by  Leiserowitz  (2005)  
demonstrated  that  most  Americans  consider  the  risks  of  climate  change  to  be  moderate,  and  will  impact  
distant  places  and  non-­‐‑human  nature  at  distant  times.  The  same  study  used  the  example  of  framing  
dangerous  climate  change  on  the  timescale  of  the  collapse  of  the  West  Antarctic  Ice  Sheet  as  creating  a  
perception  of  ‘dangerous’  as  distant,  and  less  urgent  –  the  definition  and  context  of  ‘dangerous  climate  
change’  dictates  which  solutions  will  be  considered,  and  on  what  timescale  (Leiserowitz,  2005).  Perceived  
largely  as  a  distant  wilderness  and  scientific  laboratory  (Tin  et  al.,  2009),  Antarctica  is  arguably  also  somewhat  
cognitively  disconnected  from  the  everyday  consumption  of  resources  by  industry  and  the  general  public.  We  
argue  that  it  is  important  to  consider  the  framing  aspect  of  space  and  time  when  connecting  the  science  and  
impacts  of  climate  change  in  Antarctica  to  the  everyday  activities  of  citizens  in  distant  countries.  
Furthermore,  the  Earth’s  climate  is  a  complex  system  with  many  components  that  do  not  change  linearly  
(Feichter  et  al.,  2004).  This  is  an  argument  that  has  been  co-­‐‑opted  and  frequently  utilized  by  proponents  of  
climate  change  denialism  in  asserting  that  reducing  greenhouse  gas  emission  to  prevent  catastrophic  future  
changes  will  have  minimal  or  no  tangible  outcome  in  the  short-­‐‑term,  and  are  contentious  in  the  long-­‐‑term,  
and  therefore  adaptation,  not  mitigation,  is  a  more  adequate  response  to  impending  changes  (Washington,  
2013).  This  is  often  the  argument  of  those  who  have  much  to  gain  from  maintaining  the  status  quo,  and  often  
are  in  positions  of  influence  that  enable  them  impede  policy  progress  and  benefit  from  the  resulting  inaction  
(Christoff  &  Eckersley,  2013).    
Frames  and  worldviews  
  ‘Framing’  is  an  individual’s  (typically  unconscious)  cognitive  structure  of  words  and  word  systems  that  is  
built  over  time  and  reinforced  in  neural  circuitry  through  repeated  ‘activation’,  or  exposure  to  information  
presented  in  a  similar  way  (Lakoff,  2010).  It  influences  the  way  in  which  ideas,  issues  and  concepts  are  
observed  and  understood,  and  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  way  individuals  consider  polarising  issues  such  
as  climate  action.  Frames  are  highly  dependent  on  individual  worldviews,  ideologies,  and  emotions,  and  once  
built,  frames  can  be  difficult  to  alter  –  even  in  the  face  of  new,  conflicting  information  or  scientific  discoveries.  
This  can  make  it  difficult  to  reconcile  contrasting  views,  as  utilisation  of  particular  frames  is  only  useful  if  it  
corresponds  to  an  existing  ‘learned’  storyline,  or  can  be  linked  somehow  from  an  outside  position  to  an  
existing  frame  (Nisbet  &  Scheufele,  2009).  
A  worldview,  or  ‘ultimate  value  position’,  is  developed  over  an  individual’s  lifetime,  influenced  by  a  myriad  
of  factors  including  socio-­‐‑economic  conditions,  culture,  interactions  with  family  and  other  individuals,  
education,  exposure  to  the  media,  and  individual  values  and  experiences  (Harding  et  al.,  2009).  These  
worldviews  shape  how  an  individual,  group,  or  community  identifies  with  nature  and  the  environment,  and  
can  influence  their  relationships  with  spatial  and  temporal  disparity,  as  discussed  above  ((Purdy,  2010).  From  
a  political  perspective,  the  individual  and  combined  worldviews  of  a  government  or  multilateral  group  can  
structure  and  influence  policies  and  decisions  that  impact  upon  these  disparities,  such  as  current  versus  
future  generations,  comfort  of  citizens  of  their  nation  state  versus  climate  impacts  on  distant  countries,  and  
economic  analysis  of  short-­‐‑term  benefit  versus  long-­‐‑term  detriment  (Hedlund-­‐‑de  Witt,  2012;  O'ʹBrien  &  Wolf,  
2010).  An  example  in  the  context  of  climate  change  is  that  of  senior  decision-­‐‑makers  in  government  and  
businesses  in  the  Western  world,  who  have  been  documented  as  observing  the  world  through  a  narrow  
sphere  that  prioritises  personal  reputation,  wealth,  and  competitiveness,  and  deprioritises  the  wellbeing  of  
‘others’,  whether  that  category  be  the  rest  of  the  world  in  the  present  or  future  generations  (Rickards  et  al.,  
2014).    
Framing  climate  change  science  and  policy  
The  manner  in  which  environmental  and  political  issues  are  framed  has  significant  influence  on  the  
supportiveness  of  the  general  public  of  action  to  mitigation  climate  change  (Hurlstone  et  al.,  2014).  Examples  
include  climate  as  an  emergency  situation,  a  pre-­‐‑emptive  frame  that  calls  for  action  to  address  the  concerns  
for  looming  catastrophic  climate  change,  even  in  the  absence  of  definitive  evidence  (Markusson  et  al.,  2014).  
This  is  particularly  common  in  discourse  advocating  geoengineering  tactics  (Eric  Bickel,  2013).  However,  this  
frame  is  also  seen  as  unhelpful,  with  calls  for  a  ‘less  shrill  form  of  politics’  to  engender  a  more  deliberative  
and  constructive  conversation  on  climate  action  (Markusson  et  al.,  2014).  Similarly,  the  common  adversarial  
framing  and  discrediting  opposite  sides  of  the  climate  science  and  policy  conversation  has  been  detrimental  to  
a  considered  and  thoughtful  approach  to  global  action  (Knight  &  Greenberg,  2011).    
Discussion  of  climate  policy  is  often  accompanied  by  the  tallying  of  ‘cost’  –  the  difference  between  living  
standards  growth  in  a  particular  country  when  action  is  implemented  and  when  it  is  not;  however,  this  is  
often  misinterpreted  by  the  general  public  as  an  overall  reduction  in  living  standards  over  time  rather  than  a  
slowed  growth  rate  (Hatfield-­‐‑Dodds  &  Morrison,  2010).  This  may  reinforce  the  ‘status  quo  bias’,  that  is,  the  
propensity  for  individuals  to  maintain  current  conditions  by  forgoing  action  in  order  to  prevent  unknown  
potential  risks  or  losses  in  the  future  (Samuelson  &  Zeckhauser,  1988).  A  study  in  Australia  shows  that  by  
framing  the  cost  of  mitigation  action  as  a  ‘foregone-­‐‑gain’  rather  than  an  outright  loss,  the  general  public  tends  
to  be  more  receptive  to  higher  mitigation  targets  (Hurlstone  et  al.,  2014).  Furthermore,  emphasis  on  large,  
long-­‐‑term  goals,  such  as  ‘an  80%  reduction  by  2050’,  has  been  shown  to  dissuade  the  public  from  supporting  
action,  as  it  reduces  the  perception  that  an  individual  can  make  a  difference;  however,  framing  climate  action  
in  smaller,  more  attainable  goals,  such  as  ‘a  2%  reduction  per  year  until  2050’,  provides  more  motivation  for  
individuals  to  support  collective  action  (Manning  et  al.,  2009).    
A  study  of  university  students  demonstrates  that  framing  mitigation  action  in  the  context  of  ensuring  the  
safety  of  citizens  and  avoiding  negative  impacts  of  dangerous  climate  change  is  significantly  more  persuasive  
than  messages  which  portray  the  benefits  of  climate  action  (Bertolotti  &  Catellani,  2014).  Research  by  
Dickinson  et  al.  (2013)  shows  that  climate  change  messages  are  also  very  effective  when  they  concern  an  
‘object’  that  appeals  to  the  individual,  such  as  the  dangers  inherent  for  animals  under  climate  change.    
Effective  communication  of  climate  science  to  the  general  public  therefore  relies  on  the  ability  of  scientists  and  
communicators  to  frame  issues  in  a  way  that  relates  to  the  worldviews  and  values  of  the  general  public,  to  
engage  and  translate  knowledge  and  urgency  appropriately  (Groffman  et  al.,  2010).  A  key  approach  is  that  of  
the  ‘meta-­‐‑narrative’,  in  which  multiple,  coordinated  messages  (or  narratives)  of  climate  science  information  
are  delivered  in  an  engaging,  harmonious  and  coherent  manner,  allowing  all  parties  (including  the  general  
public)  to  connect  to  the  different  areas  and  perspectives  of  climate  science  and  understand  the  limitations  of  
scientific  certainty  and  capacity  (Rapley  et  al.,  2014).    
Climate  change,  politics  and  religion  
Political  leaning  and  religion  can  act  as  substantial  barriers  to  action  on  climate  change.  Religious  beliefs  tend  
to  guide  individual  engagement  with  nature  and  the  environment,  and  vary  widely  between  different  
religions  and  political  leanings  (Haluza-­‐‑DeLay,  2014).  In  the  USA,  for  example,  there  has  been  a  noticeable  
trend  in  recent  decades  in  conservative  politicians  moving  away  ideologically  from  environmentalism  and  
climate  change  action,  promoting  sceptical  views  on  the  validity  of  not  only  climate  science,  but  of  the  theory  
of  evolution  as  well  (Dunlap  &  McCright,  2008).  These  conservative  values  often  correspond  with  religious  
leanings,  with  conservatives  in  the  USA  often  associated  with  evangelical  Christianity  and  strong  beliefs  of  
creationism  (and  the  accompanying  suspicion  of  scientists  promoting  evolutionary  theory)  (Haluza-­‐‑DeLay,  
2014).  Several  narratives  have  been  identified  from  Christianity  in  the  USA  as  to  a  relationship  with  nature  
and  the  associated  perspective  on  climate  change,  ranging  from  views  of  environmental  stewardship,  to  ideas  
of  taming  the  wilderness  to  become  God’s  garden,  or  that  progress  and  change  in  God’s  garden  should  be  
encouraged  (Wardekker  et  al.,  2009).  A  survey  by  Reddy  et  al.  (2013)  found  that  over  50%  of  participants  from  
South  Africa,  66%  of  participants  from  India,  and  50%  of  surveyed  Americans  believe  that  policymakers  
depend  too  much  on  science  and  not  enough  of  faith.  In  order  to  bridge  this  divide  between  faith  and  
scientific  reasoning,  it  is  vital  to  remove  the  perspective  that  science  and  faith  are  mutually  exclusive.  For  
example,  one  potential  solution  could  be  reframing  climate  science  to  more  easily  co-­‐‑exist  with  religious  
frameworks,  and  more  easily  appeal  to  moral  and  ethical  values  of  environmental  and  planetary  stewardship  
that  are  common  between  many  religions  and  political  views  (Wilson,  2006).    
     
The  role  of  scientists  in  climate  policy  
Pure,  basic  scientific  research  has  possessed  perceived  superiority  over  applied  research  since  the  time  of  the  
Greeks,  and  over  the  centuries  has  developed  into  a  ‘linear’  model  of  innovation  (Godin,  2006).  In  the  linear  
model,  basic  research  progresses  to  applied  research  and  development,  before  advancing  and  concluding  
with  diffusion  into  society  and  the  economy  (Godin,  2006).  It  has  been  argued  that  the  simplicity  of  the  linear  
model  makes  it  useful  at  the  interface  of  science  and  policy,  as  dealing  with  completely  interconnected  
systems  is,  by  contrast,  significantly  more  complicated  (Balconi  et  al.,  2010).  However,  in  terms  of  climate  
policy,  the  linear  model  is  considered  inferior  to  the  ‘co-­‐‑production  model’,  a  collaborative,  interdisciplinary  
approach  incorporating  scientists,  policymakers,  members  of  industry  and  other  experts,  and  the  general  
public  (Rapley  et  al.,  2014).  To  function  as  part  of  the  co-­‐‑production  model,  Pielke  (2007)  argues  that  scientists  
must  adopt  one  of  four  idealized  roles:  
the  pure  scientist,  the  science  arbiter,  the  
issue  advocate,  or  the  honest  broker,  
which  are  further  described  in  Figure  3.    
Pielke  (2007)  proposes  that  with  issues  
such  as  climate  change  where  moderate  
or  high  uncertainty  exists  in  outcomes,  
and  where  values  are  conflicting,  each  of  
the  roles  (though  particularly  those  of  
pure  scientist  and  science  arbiter)  runs  the  
risk  of  ‘stealth  issue  advocacy’,  where  a  
scientist  may  unconsciously  or  
deliberately  promote  an  outcome  while  
appearing  to  focus  only  on  the  science.  
All  four  roles  are  necessary  to  the  
development  of  climate  policy,  though  
the  role  of  the  honest  broker  is  often  
considered  the  most  useful  for  the  co-­‐‑
productive  model  (Pielke,  2007;  Rapley  et  
al.,  2014).    
  
1. Pure  Scientist  –  producing  scientific  knowledge  and  
information,  focused  on  contributing  to  a  discipline’s  
knowledge  repository  with  little  or  no  interactions  with  
the  policy  and  decision-­‐‑making  end-­‐‑user;  
2. Science  Arbiter  –  responding  to  factual  questions  that  
decision-­‐‑makers  may  have  of  the  science,  while  avoiding  
policy  discussions  and  working  to  eliminate  options  that  
are  not  adequately  supported  by  scientific  evidence;  
3. Issue  Advocate  –  actively  participating  in  policy-­‐‑making  
processes,  guiding  discussions  towards  a  particular  
course  of  action  that  is  supported  by  scientific  evidence;  
4. Honest  Broker  –  actively  participating  in  policy-­‐‑making  
processes,  conveying  the  full  scope  of  options  available  
to  policy  decision-­‐‑makers  and  clarifying  the  strengths  
and  weaknesses  of  all  options.  
Figure  3:  The  four  idealised  roles  for  scientists  in  a  co-­‐‑productive  model  
(summarised  from  Pielke  [2007])  
Boundary  organisations  in  climate  science  
A  significant  disciplinary  divide  between  climate  scientists  and  policy-­‐‑makers  is  perception  of  disciplinary  
dominance:  policy-­‐‑makers  tend  to  see  their  work  as  ‘on  top’  and  that  scientists  are  a  resource  to  call  upon  
when  required,  whereas  scientists  view  their  role  as  objective  knowledge  transfer  that  provides  expert  
judgement  to  people  in  power  (Hoppe  et  al.,  2013).  It  has  been  suggested  that  boundary  organisations,  which  
provide  ‘boundary  work’  such  as  assessment  of  scientific  work  in  conjunction  with  design  of  policy  
instruments  and  impacts,  could  hold  the  key  to  bridging  the  disciplinary  divide  science  and  policy  (Hoppe  et  
al.,  2013).  The  purpose  of  a  boundary  organisation  is  to  ‘facilitate  collaboration  and  information  flow  between  
the  research  and  public  policy  communities’  (Parker  &  Crona,  2012).  Boundary  organisations  in  climate  
science  and  policy  already  exist;  one  well-­‐‑known  example  being  the  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  
Change  (IPCC).    
Although  it  enjoyed  an  excellent  reputation  during  the  early  years  of  its  existence,  more  recently,  the  IPCC  
has  been  subjected  to  criticism  about  its  methods  and  output.  For  example,  the  exhaustive,  900-­‐‑page  reports  
require  a  lengthy  production  process,  and  often  areas  of  the  science  are  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑date  by  the  time  the  report  
reaches  publication  (Nature,  2013).  This  has  prompted  questions  within  the  science  community  as  to  whether  
the  IPCC  should  continue  to  produce  large-­‐‑scale  reports  into  the  future,  when  much  of  the  science  is  no  
longer  ‘new’,  or  whether  areas  of  climate  science  should  be  broken  into  smaller,  more  targeted  reports  (such  
as  the  recent  Special  Report  on  Climate  Extremes)  to  focus  on  areas  that  have  high  uncertainty,  where  
knowledge  can  evolve  more  quickly,  and/or  are  areas  of  particular  political  import  (Nature,  2013).  There  have  
been  calls  to  reform  the  IPCC’s  roots  in  the  linear  model  of  innovation,  using  the  ‘linear  knowledge  
production’  theory  that  more  research  will  lead  to  more  certainty  and  better  policy  outcomes,  advising  policy-­‐‑
makers  in  a  one-­‐‑way  conversation  (Beck,  2011).  It  has  also  been  argued  that  the  IPCC  has  a  monopoly  on  the  
transfer  of  climate  science  information  to  advise  international  policy-­‐‑makers,  and  that  over  time,  without  
competition,  the  IPCC’s  quality  has  declined  and  has  engaged  in  tasks  beyond  its  mandate  (Tol,  2011).  Critics  
suggest  that  it  would  be  beneficial  for  climate  science  and  policy  alike  to  establish  other  boundary  
organisations,  specialised  in  particular  climate  science  aspects,  to  provide  competition  and  encourage  
development  in  particular  aspects  (Tol,  2011).    
Many  aspects  of  Antarctic  climate  science  have  high  levels  of  uncertainty,  and  scientific  understanding  of  the  
dynamics  and  drivers  in  many  parts  of  the  climate  system  have  the  capacity  to  evolve  very  quickly.  
Furthermore,  the  potential  impacts  of  Antarctic  climate  change  are  of  global  significance.  In  1957,  these  factors  
led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Scientific  Committee  on  Antarctic  Research  (SCAR),  an  interdisciplinary  
committee  as  part  of  the  International  Council  for  Science  (ICSU)  with  the  research  objective  of  ‘initiating,  
developing  and  coordinating  high  quality  international  scientific  research  in  the  Antarctic  region  (including  
the  Southern  Ocean),  and  on  the  role  of  the  Antarctic  region  in  the  Earth  system’  (SCAR,  2015a).  SCAR  also  
plays  a  role  in  advising  policy  for  the  Antarctic  Treaty  Consultative  Meetings, and  providing  expert  advice  to  
international  organisations  such  as  the  IPCC  on  conservation  and  management  of  Antarctica  as  well  as  
Antarctica’s  role  in  the  Earth’s  climate  system.  However,  although  SCAR  is  a  highly  regarded  source  of  
research  and  policy  advice  on  Antarctic  climate  science,  it  does  not  specifically  address  the  communication  of  
how  impacts  of  climate  change  on  Antarctica  impact  on  the  rest  of  the  world  –  the  ‘global  teleconnections’  of  
Antarctica  (Kennicutt  II,  2014).  Therefore,  we  argue  that  there  is  a  need  for  the  establishment  of  a  sub-­‐‑
committee  within  SCAR  producing  boundary  work  integrating  Antarctic  climate  specialists  and  other  
scientists  with  international  policy  experts  and  other  relevant  stakeholders  in  a  co-­‐‑production  model  of  
knowledge  exchange  and  interdisciplinary  research  to  improve  the  translation  of  research  output  into  the  
community  and  policy  domain,  and  to  engender  public  support  for  robust  climate  action.       
Gaining  traction  on  climate  change  
A  contemporary  standing  committee  
The  Scientific  Committee  on  Antarctic  Research  engages  a  collection  of  sub-­‐‑committees  as  advisories  to  its  
secretariat,  a  permanent  administrative  department  of  SCAR.  Figure  4  illustrates  the  organisational  structure  
utilised  by  SCAR  as  of  December  2014.  
  
Figure  4:  An  overview  of  SCAR  as  at  December  2014  (SCAR,  2015b).  The  proposed  standing  committee  would  be  
subordinate  to  the  secretariat.  
An  additional  standing  committee  of  permanent  residence  within  the  SCAR  organisation  given  jurisdiction  
over  the  production  of  transparent  boundary  work  aimed  at  bridging  the  gap  between  research  output,  
policy,  and  the  communication  of  these  results  to  the  diverse  intellectual  gradient  of  the  public  domain  would  
provide  physical  proof  of  SCAR’s  commitment  to  its  fifth  mission  objective,  to  communicate  scientific  
information  about  the  Antarctic  region  to  the  public  (ICSU,  2015).  A  standing  committee  dedicated  to  the  rendition  
of  scientific  research  to  the  community  and  policy  domain  requires  a  disparate  assemblage  of  Antarctic  
science  experts,  physical  sciences  experts,  social  science  experts,  relevantly  experienced  policy  makers,  NGO  
representatives  and  wider  education  specialists.  Such  a  specialised  group  would  require  significant  and  
ultimately  unnecessary  amounts  of  coordination  to  begin  anew.  Experts  in  Antarctic  science  and  other  
pertinent  disciplines  are  abundantly  represented  throughout  SCAR;  the  vice  presidents  who  constitute  the  
majority  of  the  executive  committee  themselves  stem  the  diverse  academic  specialties  of  marine  biology,  
geology  and  meteorology.  A  diversion  of  SCAR’s  existing  intellectual  resources  into  the  Antarctic  science  
communication  standing  committee,  complemented  by  small  capital  expenditure  would  fashion  the  
foundations  for  more  effective  communication  on  the  societal-­‐‑political  aspects  of  climate  change.  A  new  sub-­‐‑
committee  aimed  at  conveying  Antarctic  knowledge  would  face  the  corresponding  modern  challenges  
associated  with  the  public’s  often  sceptical  and  cynical  opinions  (Baron,  2010)  in  addition  to  the  fore-­‐‑
mentioned  adversarial  framing  and  discreditation  of  opposite  sides  in  popular  climate  science  and  policy  
debates  (Knight  &  Greenberg,  2011).  In  order  for  the  proposed  standing  committee  to  prosper  and  provide  
effective  scientific  finding  communication  a  strong  education,  outreach  and  communication  (EOC)  agenda  is  
required  to  build  upon  the  knowledge  rich  anthropological  foundation  (Provencher  et  al.,  2011).  The  EOC  
program  for  SCAR’s  new  standing  committee  would  vehemently  incorporate  the  four  recommendations  
made  by  Provencher  et  al.  (2011)  for  science  outreach  programs  with  astute  focus  upon  the  second  
recommendation,  where  scientists  who  are  good  communicators  are  given  an  enhanced  role  and  encouraged  
to  undertake  EOC.  Scientists  who  do  not  communication  in  a  fluent  and  natural  manner  would  be  partnered  
with  bodies  that  have  robust  EOC  strategies.  Neural  framing  appears  recurrently  throughout  the  general  
public’s  assessments  of  climate  change  and  establishes  a  necessity  for  project  leaders  and  individuals  in  
significant  research  roles  to  be  engaged  in  the  EOC  strategy,  most  importantly,  the  outreach  or  informal  
education  component  (Provencher  et  al.,  2011).    Compulsory  participation  in  outreach  would  compel  the  
thought  process  of  how  this  research  could  be  conveyed  to  diverse  intelect  levels  throughout  the  
experimentation  process,  even  factoring  into  how  the  research  is  conducted.  Besley  &  Tanner  (2011)  indicate  
that  some  communication  scholars  see  condescending  undertones  when  the  scientific  community  interacts  
with  the  public  and  a  move  by  SCAR  to  incorporate  project  leaders  into  the  outreach  component  may  mitigate  
this  occasional  disdainment.  
SCAR  is  the  most  logical  professional  body,  as  opposed  to  organisations  such  as  the  United  Nations,  to  
accommodate  a  standing  committee  dedicated  to  the  unification  of  climate  scientists,  general  public,  policy  
makers  and  relevant  stakeholders.  SCAR  already  possesses  the  intellectual  resources  required  to  produce  
objective  science  and  needs  only  to  train  non-­‐‑scientists  in  evidence  based  reasoning.  SCAR’s  fifth  mission  
objective  and  its  aim  to  be  the  leading  independent  organisation  for  facilitating  and  coordinating  Antarctic  
research  make  SCAR  the  only  choice  for  this  Antarctic  science  communication  sub-­‐‑committee.  
A  diversion  of  resources  within  SCAR  to  form  the  new  standing  committee  for  the  translation  of  research  
output  into  the  community  and  policy  domain  to  engender  public  support  for  robust  climate  action  prevails  
to  be  the  most  advantageous  use  of  the  association,  a  textbook  case  for  boundary  organisations  achievement.  
Interdisciplinarity  
Interdisciplinarity  is  not  currently  commonplace  in  climate  research  (Bjurström  &  Polk,  2011).  To  achieve  
optimal  co-­‐‑production  research  and  policy  in  climate  science,  interdisciplinarity  must  be  encouraged  and  
promoted.  A  significant  barrier  to  interdisciplinarity  in  climate  research  is  the  use  of  different  ‘languages’,  
requiring  substantial  investment  of  time  and  effort  to  establish  shared  vocabularies  and  ontologies  (Bracken  &  
Oughton,  2006).  This  will  be  vital  to  the  effective  integration  of  disciplines  in  Antarctic  climate  science,  where  
a  shared  understanding  of  temporal  and  spatial  perspectives,  language  differences,  and  jargon  must  be  
developed.  Some  general  principles  have  been  suggested  for  effective  interdisciplinary  research  that  can  be  
applied  to  integrated  Antarctic  climate  research  and  policy  (Dovers,  2005):  
• Problem  focus  –  the  shared  problems  of  climate  change,  communication  and  translation  of  knowledge  
to  both  policy-­‐‑makers  and  the  general  public,  and  eliciting  effective  action  as  a  result,  all  act  as  an  
external  position  for  assessing  research  output.  This  is  also  useful  to  determine  the  required  skills  and  
perspectives  at  preparatory  stages  of  boundary  work;  
• Alertness  –  remaining  aware  of  agendas  and  policy  objectives  that  may  become  dominant;  
• Evaluation  and  reflexive  capacity  –  continually  assessing  the  integrative  initiatives  of  the  boundary  
work  and  ensuring  these  needs  are  being  met;  
• Openness  –  welcoming  new  theories,  disciplines,  methods,  ideas,  and  knowledge  systems  to  broaden  
potential  approaches  and  prevent  stagnation  in  a  single  integrative  approach;  
• Intra-­‐‑disciplinary  variation  –  embracing  different  perspectives,  methods  and  ideas  from  within  
individual  disciplines;  
• Systems  orientation  –  conceptualising  basic  systems  concepts  to  highlight  interconnections  between  
disciplines;  
• Scale  awareness  –  appreciating  differences  in  spatial  and  temporal  differences  between  disciplines  
and  situations;  and    
• Personal  and  group  qualities  –  ensuring  appropriate  group  dynamics  for  effective  boundary  
interactions.  
As  well  as  incorporating  the  above  principles,  integrated  boundary  work  requires  the  consideration  of  
different  and  changeable  boundaries  and  norms  within  the  science  policy  environment,  which  are  often  
indefinable,  diverse,  or  even  contestable  (Head,  2008).  Lastly,  the  scope  of  the  boundary  work  must  be  clearly  
defined,  to  ensure  that  the  focus  remains  on  interdisciplinary  interactions  for  climate  science  and  
communication,  and  not  the  transition  to  multidisciplinary  research  where  the  addition  of  non-­‐‑shared  
languages  and  norms  could  result  in  a  lack  of  integration  in  research  output  (Bjurström  &  Polk,  2011).         
Conclusions  
Although  a  substantial  effort  has  been  made  to  improve  the  communication  of  Antarctic  climate  science  and  
climate  science  generally,  there  is  clearly  room  for  improvement.  Recent  statistics  show  that  public  education  
on  climate  science  is  lacking,  and  that  public  mistrust  in  science  (reinforced  by  misrepresentation  of  climate  
science  and  scientists  in  the  media)  is  creating  barriers  for  effective  communication.  That  the  climate  action  
message  is  not  getting  through  is  due  partly  to  it  not  being  framed  effectively,  and  needs  to  be  reconsidered  to  
find  common  ground  between  competing  worldviews,  values,  and  religious  beliefs.  Framing  of  space  and  
time  in  relation  to  climate  change  and  Antarctica  also  needs  to  be  reassessed,  to  reduce  the  perceived  
disparity  between  the  general  public  and  the  impacts  of  climate  change.  One  way  to  achieve  this  is  a  
concerted  training  campaign,  for  both  scientists  and  non-­‐‑scientists,  to  broaden  understanding  of  evidence-­‐‑
based  debate  among  these  players  in  the  science-­‐‑policy  environment.  Another  highly  effective  strategy  is  to  
establish  boundary  work,  integrating  interdisciplinary  research  with  education,  outreach  and  communication  
plans.  The  role  of  scientists  in  these  boundary  organisations  or  committees  is  of  paramount  importance,  as  it  
determines  the  breadth  of  the  scope  of  policy  options  available  to  decision-­‐‑makers.  Furthermore,  it  is  essential  
to  ensure  the  integration  of  research  and  policy  throughout  the  duration  of  the  boundary  work,  preventing  
the  division  of  scientific  work  as  concluding  at  the  publication  stage  and  decision-­‐‑making  to  commence  at  the  
conclusion  of  the  scientific  work.  
We  recommend  the  establishment  of  a  targeted  boundary  committee  tasked  with  compiling,  framing  and  
communicating  both  Antarctic  climate  science  and  its  global  teleconnections  to  the  general  public,  
policymakers  and  other  stakeholders.  The  proposed  committee  would  act  as  a  sub-­‐‑committee  to  the  Scientific  
Committee  on  Antarctic  Research  (SCAR),  and  utilise  diversion  of  SCAR’s  existing  intellectual  resources  as  
well  as  the  acquisition  of  additional  funding.  Education,  Outreach  and  Communication  (EOC)  strategies  
would  be  a  consistent  theme  in  all  levels  of  boundary  work  of  the  sub-­‐‑committee,  to  improve  engagement  of  
Antarctic  science  and  climate  science  more  generally  with  the  public  and  policy  stakeholders.  By  engaging  
and  educating  these  stakeholders  on  the  urgency  and  relevance  of  Antarctic  climate  science,  traction  on  
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